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Laura Candiotto1 
Epistemic emotions. 
The building blocks of intellectual virtues 
 
 
Abstract 
Discussing the notion of “epistemic emotions” as proposed by Morton (2010), and 
his argument for which intellectual virtues will be “hard to attain” without those 
emotions, I introduce the thesis for which epistemic emotions constitute one of 
the building blocks of intellectual virtues, in order to provide an explanation of the 
cognitive process that binds the two. Epistemic emotions are building blocks, as: 
(1) motivational component and (2) transformative component, and they assay 
their causal role as necessary components (but not sufficient) of intellectual vir-
tues. Framing the argument within virtue responsibilism, I explain the machinery 
that leads from epistemic emotions to intellectual virtues, and then from those to 
affective abilities, stressing the role of training in the process of transformation of 
the agent in the epistemic journey. Affective abilities, as the refined epistemic 
emotions that are ready to use within the practice of intellectual virtues, are the 
secure and beneficial dispositions that enhance the responsible practice of cogni-
tion. 
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While everyone would agree that anger or envy  
can have a role in explaining our epistemic failings,  
few theorists insist that appropriate patterns of affective response 
 may be required for inquiring or believing well. 
Christopher Hookway 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the leading approaches on emotions within the contemporary 
debate is the one according to which emotions are appraisal, percep-
                                                          
1 Laura.Candiotto@ed.ac.uk. 
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tion, or even judgement of values, disclosing the valence of the ob-
jects toward which they are directed2. In this paper, I refer to a very 
specific value, the value of knowledge, i.e., the object “knowledge”, 
recognised as something that has values for human beings. My goal is 
to grasp the meaning and function of those emotions that may lead 
to knowledge, recognised as value, and towards which the epistemic 
agent directs her efforts. The idea that emotions are essential to vir-
tue is not new, and it founds its ancient roots in Aristotle’s works. 
Nevertheless, the debate has been centred around moral emotions, 
and only few studies have been devoted to those emotions that deal 
with knowledge. 
The notion of “epistemic emotions” has been introduced in the 
contemporary debate by Morton (2010), and before him, as “intellec-
tual emotions”, by Stocker (2004), or, as “cognitive emotions”, by 
Scheffler (1991). The definition of epistemic emotions as being those 
emotions that are directed at knowing is a very broad one, and the 
role, and even the existence, of such kind of emotions are still very 
controversial in the contemporary debate, more so because it ques-
tions the relationship between the affective and the cognitive sys-
tems.  
I assume a well-determined approach regarding knowledge as 
value, i.e., the one proposed by virtue epistemology3 – and, specifi-
cally, I will refer to its character-based version, also known as virtue 
responsibilism, introduced by Lorraine Code (1987)4 – for which the 
intellectual virtues should not be understood as mere faculties or ca-
pacities5, but as those character traits that define the excellent dispo-
                                                          
2 Peter Goldie (2002) is seen as one of the most prominent thinkers within a 
branch of this model, the one that emphasises the “feeling towards” as the 
source of the recognition of the value. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
roots of the approach go back to the origin of the Western philosophical thought, 
and has noble ancestors, just think of Aristotle or Husserl. See Mulligan 2010 for 
a comprehensive introduction to the approach. 
3 The birth of this field of study is recognised in the article written by Ernest Sosa 
in the early 1980s (Sosa 1980), where he suggested an account on justified true 
belief, based upon intellectual virtues. 
4 See also Kavnvig 1992, Montmarquet 1993, Hookway 2000, Baehr 2011, and 
especially Zagzebski (1996), who provided the first systematic account of the 
character-based approach. 
5 These are the intellectual virtues as understood by the virtue reliabilists. See Ax-
tell (2000) for a brief introduction about the differences between the two mod-
els. 
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sitions of a responsible epistemic agent. Thus, in order to grasp the 
role of epistemic emotions, my focus will be directed to the clarifica-
tion of the relationship between epistemic emotions and intellectual 
virtues within the knowing processes. 
In this approach, the value of knowledge and the possibility of its 
achievement are dependent upon the abilities and character traits of 
the epistemic agents. Even if this approach lends a strong value to in-
tellectual virtues, and not explicitly to emotions, it nevertheless 
seems the best choice to unlock the analysis towards epistemic emo-
tions and affective abilities. In fact, I noticed that within the virtue 
epistemology literature, there are some intriguing synonyms – specif-
ically, two examples. We refer to curiosity both as an epistemic emo-
tion as well as an intellectual virtue or, in the case of courage, we just 
add the adjective “intellectual” to courage, in order to make it an in-
tellectual virtue and not just an emotion. These synonyms may mean 
many things, from hiding a lack of analysis – understanding as syno-
nyms, two things that are not the same – to an error of classification; 
are we sure, for example, that curiosity is an intellectual virtue and 
not an epistemic emotion, or simply that the synonymy is not per-
ceived, in this case, as problematic? 
As Morton (2010) has noticed, the words often do triple duty and, 
thus, we may have a curious character moved by the emotions of cu-
riosity who, performing her cognitive acts, also engages in curiosity as 
an intellectual virtue. Nevertheless, I think that this synonymy among 
curiosity as a character trait, curiosity as a quality of action, and curi-
osity as an intellectual virtue may create confusion. Most important 
for my topic, it may dismiss the epistemic role of the emotions within 
virtue epistemology since it will focus on curiosity as an intellectual 
virtue only. 
In fact, I do not think – as the forthcoming revised version of the 
lemma dedicated to virtue epistemology in the SEP6 – that it is un-
controversial to say that many virtues are emotional dispositions, 
                                                                                                                      
 
6 See Alfano, Greco, Turri (forthcoming). Zagzebski (1996: 131) has recognised, 
for example, the emotions characteristic of the virtue of courage that motivates 
acts of courage, but she says that they have no name. She has also claimed that 
the “common vocabulary is misleading” (1996: 106), recognising that the same 
term may be used for virtues, skills, and emotions. Alfano (2016), on the other 
hand, has suggested to index virtues, thanks to the emotions they govern, pre-
cisely because it is easier, in his opinion, to individuate emotions than virtues. 
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precisely because many practitioners deny, or at least do not explicit-
ly state, the existence of these kind of epistemic emotions. Moreover, 
and I will come back to it in due course of time, they risk not taking 
into consideration the impact that the affective engagement may 
have for the understanding of the embodied and embedded dimen-
sion of the epistemic practices7. 
Therefore, my aim is to uncover and reveal the relationship be-
tween epistemic emotions and intellectual virtues within the charac-
ter traits of the epistemic agent, using the hypothesis that epistemic 
emotions and intellectual virtues are two different things. Specifically, 
I will explain the process that leads from emotions to intellectual vir-
tues, and from them to affective abilities. In fact, if a lot has been said 
about the connection between intellectual virtues and belief-building 
(Hookway 2003a), it is not the same for the first segment of this cog-
nitive machinery. 
First, I will fine-grain the notion, detecting the role of epistemic 
emotions within the knowing and the development of the epistemic 
character of the agent. Next, underlying the differences between ep-
istemic emotions and intellectual virtues, I would explain the machin-
ery between them, lighting on the procedure that leads from one to 
the other. Finally, analysing the ontogenesis of intellectual virtues, I 
will introduce the notion of affective ability as the result of a good ep-
istemic training. Therefore, the procedure that leads from epistemic 
emotions to intellectual virtues, and from them to the affective abili-
ties, will be recognised as the one that integrates emotions within the 
knowing process. 
 
 
2. The intellectual virtues’ components 
 
For Zagzebski (1996: 137), intellectual virtues have two components, 
the motivational and the success ones, the first leading to produce a 
certain desired end, which is knowledge, and the second establishing 
the reliable success in bringing about that end. These components 
                                                          
7 This is true if we would recognise that bodily feelings are associated with emo-
tional experiences and, thus, also to the epistemic ones. On the somatic states 
involved in cognitive processes, see Damasio 1994. On the embodied appraisal 
theory, especially regarding how moral values are based on emotional responses, 
see Prinz 2004. 
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that refer to the Aristotelian characterisation of moral virtues pertain 
to the intellectual ones because, in Zagzebski’s account, intellectual 
virtues are character traits and dispositions, exactly as the moral 
ones8. As underlined by Roberts and Jay Wood (2007: 72), intellectual 
motivation and dispositions to epistemic success are part of the ex-
cellent intellectual life as a whole. As is well known, one of the key 
characteristics ascribed to emotions is to be a motive for action, and, 
in our specific case of epistemic emotions, a motive for the act of 
knowing. Arguably – I introduce it here and I will come back to it later 
on – we cannot embrace the division that states that the intellectual 
virtues are for thinking and the moral ones for character, because it is 
precisely in the education of the character that both, the moral and 
the intellectual virtues, are trained and acquired. Moreover, the dis-
tinction between practical and theoretical ends diminishes, in the 
acknowledgement that the same thinking is an activity pursued be-
cause the agent identifies the value of its fulfilment as knowing. 
We may detect the epistemic role for the emotions in the motiva-
tional component within Zagzebski’s analysis of the intellectual vir-
tues’ components, specifically as the natural energy of the motiva-
tional component. In this way, epistemic emotions may be under-
stood as the motives towards which the agent gives value, i.e., the 
knowledge9. Moreover, Zagzebski’s account exposes a second mean-
ing, more specific for virtue epistemology: epistemic emotions as 
steps for the development of the epistemic character as an excellent 
knower. The question is: what constitutes their action? Shouldn’t be 
they at work here per accidens, or as side-effects? Have the epistemic 
emotions a beneficial role per se within those components that ena-
ble the excellence of the cognitive agent, and thus, reaching cognitive 
success? 
                                                          
8 In fact, for Zagzebski, moral and intellectual virtues should not be split, as Aris-
totle did, because they do not differ in their ends, i.e., the flourishing of the agent 
through knowledge and right actions. Also, Roberts & Jay Wood (2007) are 
against a strict dichotomy between moral and intellectual virtues. They have ar-
gued for the concern-based construal account of the emotions, for which emo-
tions have a deliberative character – they are based on the will – and act as mo-
tives for. On the other side, for the necessity to distinguish them following the 
Aristotelian account by the practical or theoretical ends, see Annas 2003. 
9 Epistemic emotions may be motives by themselves or enabling condition for the 
production of other motives. 
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These questions, in nuce, are constrained within their limitations 
and serve as the background of the inquiry. As introduction, I believe 
that one of the merits of the contemporary research within charac-
ter-based epistemology is to challenge the idea of avoiding the per-
sonal and subjective traits of the agent to attain knowledge. On the 
contrary, stressing that it pertains to certain traits – recognised as in-
tellectual excellences – to lead the agent to knowledge, this venue of 
research opens the door to further inquiries on the features and 
components of these excellences and their relevance for knowledge. 
My thesis is that the existence of epistemic emotions precisely consti-
tutes one of these components. Therefore, the necessity to question 
the supposed harmful status of the emotions emerges clearly, since 
they are one of the components of what is recognised as excellent, 
i.e., intellectual virtues as the character dispositions to think well.  
It might be objected that intellectual virtues have to fight against 
one of their components recognised as being disadvantageous. I do 
not think this is the case and I’m going to explain why throughout the 
paper, in particular, discussing Morton’s argument, and introducing 
the notion of affective ability. As preliminary reply to the objection, I 
can say that this does not mean that there aren’t cases in which the 
intellectual virtues arise from a battle within contrasting emotions or, 
also, cases where it is definitely the performance of the virtue that 
makes the emotional component virtuous10. But this recognition is 
not something that invalidates my approach since, on the contrary, it 
reinforces the idea for which we should train the epistemic emotions 
in order to harmonise them to virtue and stabilise their power within 
the process. 
 
 
3. From epistemic emotions to intellectual virtues 
 
Morton (2010), has underlined the connection between epistemic 
emotions and intellectual virtues and, explaining the process, has 
claimed that it is difficult for a human being to act virtuously without 
                                                          
10 A very interesting example is the one of shame as a component of modesty 
and intellectual humility. 
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epistemic emotions; however, there is no necessity for it11. Thus, 
what he argues for is not a “necessity thesis” on the role of epistemic 
emotions for intellectual virtues, but a softer version of it that states 
that it would be very difficult to achieve intellectual virtues without 
epistemic emotions; however, in the meantime, it will not be impos-
sible. 
First of all, what is evident in this argument is the difference be-
tween the phrases “hard to do without” and “necessary with”. This 
argument is based on the phenomenological recognition that there 
are few cases in which the intellectual virtues may arise emotionless-
ly. In fact, arguing for this softer implication between epistemic emo-
tions and intellectual virtues, he identifies those cases in which peo-
ple think and know virtuously (i.e., with intellectual virtues) and with-
out being pushed by epistemic emotions, as in the case of the well-
trained and excellent young scientist who does not care about the 
subject. I agree with him on this example, and recognise that in very 
specific cases it is even best to not be moved by certain emotions – as 
for the cold mind of a surgeon required to perform her professional 
task, and the consequent denial to operate on members of her own 
family, because emotions may affect her mind. Nevertheless, I think 
that these are very specific cases as exceptions to the “necessity the-
sis”. In fact, as the same Morton has acknowledged, “the normal hu-
man operation of many virtues involves the activation of emotions 
that move the agent to the required pattern of action” (Morton 2010: 
394), i.e., the practice of her intellectual virtues as an epistemic abil-
ity. 
Thus, the difference between “harder without emotions” and 
“necessary with emotions” resides in the attempt to not exclude the 
counterexamples that, nevertheless, do not depict the normal way of 
acting, where “normal human beings would find it hard to sustain the 
virtue if they were not capable of emotion” (Morton 2010: 394). I 
think that here we should not understand “normality” as the opposite 
of pathological cases, but as a way to say that, in most of the cases, 
intellectual virtues follow epistemic emotions. Therefore, I propose to 
understand Morton’s argument as an argument based on statistical 
evidence, stating that in most cases it is more probable that an intel-
                                                          
11 “[...] there are emotions that play an important and hard-to-replace role” 
(Morton 2010: 386); “[...] the absence of epistemic emotion seems to make 
things harder rather than impossible” (Morton 2010: 391). 
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lectual virtue is dependent on an epistemic emotion than the contra-
ry, and the cause of it depends, in Morton’s view, on our biological 
constitution as human beings. 
Even if I agree with Morton in most of his arguments, I cannot 
state, as he does, that in the cases he offers as exceptions – we take 
the one of the young scientist that, later on in Morton’s paper, is de-
picted as a young chemist that investigates for a carcinogen in baby 
bottles – the agents may not feel any emotions at all, even if they are 
demonstrating their intellectual virtues. On the contrary, I think that 
it is necessary to recognise that they were moved by other motives, 
for example: the ambition to develop their career, as the scientist is 
depicted in the first case; or the responsibility towards the citizens’ 
health, in the second. 
Finally, analysing these cases, the crucial question about the con-
ceivability of emotionless intellectual virtues arises. My first answer is 
that it is very implausible to conceive emotionless intellectual virtues, 
but this does not mean that emotions should be at work every time 
that one specific intellectual virtue is at work, since intellectual vir-
tues, in the expert cognitive agent, become an intellectual habitus. In 
fact, the habitus prevents the organism from using a large amount of 
energy at any time the activation of a virtue is needed. At the same 
time, however, the habitus has been built by the reiteration of the 
pattern of emotions, combined with other skills and abilities. The ha-
bitualisation and sedimentation of epistemic emotions into intellec-
tual virtues arise through the exercise and the training, as I will ex-
plain, depicting affective abilities in section five, and it is consistent 
with the core idea of character-based virtue epistemology, for which 
knowing is an exercise through which the agent develops her intellec-
tual skills. My point here is that the habitualisation of epistemic emo-
tions should be understood within this process too. Thus, an excellent 
and expert epistemic agent would know if she needs to activate the 
required epistemic emotions as affective abilities, at the right time, in 
the right place, and in connection with other skills. 
Consider the example of the very passionate teacher who, after 
many years of teaching, does not feel the “fire of the passion” for 
teaching in the present moment as she did when she was young; 
nevertheless, she is able to enthusiastically involve the students in 
the lessons. One of the abilities of this expert teacher, thus, will also 
be the reactivation of certain affective abilities, if she would need 
them, for a certain and specific situation. If she would not need them, 
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her ability will enable her to proceed anyway, being moved by her ex-
cellent habitus. This example shows that the recognition that some 
specific epistemic emotions are not at work in the actual perfor-
mance of the intellectual virtue in certain cases does not mean that 
they are not a component of it. In fact, they are available as affective 
abilities, and ready to enact in certain cases, as I will argue in section 
five. 
Coming back to Morton’s example about the young scientist, and 
to the fact that not having activated the specific epistemic emotion 
connected to the specific intellectual virtues does not mean that the 
agent is emotionless, I have also noticed that certain intellectual vir-
tues may be activated by despicable emotions or aspirations. I may 
imagine, in fact, that it is not curiosity, love for truth, or epistemic 
worry that activates the young scientist’s intellectual virtue of scruti-
ny and careful attention towards the production of scientific data, but 
maybe her ambition, or even her insecurity, that makes her seek the 
approval of her boss12. Therefore, we should recognise that our 
agency is moved by different, and sometimes contrasting, causes, 
each one bringing their emotional component13. Nevertheless, cases 
such as this do not show that a specific intellectual virtue arises from 
a vicious emotion, i.e., there is no causal relationship between them, 
but only that this specific intellectual virtue, trained within the exer-
cise of its proper emotions, is at work here, within a context where 
the emotions at play are not the ones that constitute it, but others. 
Moreover, it should be noticed that one specific intellectual virtue 
may be built and activated by different epistemic emotions, arising 
from the contexts. 
Morton’s argument also leads to another topic, very important for 
my aim, and to which I will come back in the last section. In fact, Mor-
ton has underlined the ethical stance involved in the process, saying 
that the enquiry, based on emotionless virtues, would tend to be less 
disinterested than many of the others. In this way, his argument 
                                                          
12 In the meantime, we should be aware that certain skills that seems emotion-
less may be supported by the emotions. For example, empirical studies have pro-
vided evidence for the relationship between emotions and attention, in particular 
regarding the role of emotions in making things salient for us. See Brady 2013. 
13 Aristotle, one of the fathers of virtue epistemology, while exploring the relation 
of the rational and the irrational parts of the soul, found a broad range of overlap 
around their borderline (or better, border-region), where emotions communicate 
with concepts, building, on my reading, rationality. 
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based on statical evidence, as I have called it, implies not only what is 
more natural for knowing, but also what is best, or what is most de-
sirable for the production of the right epistemic practice. Thinking 
well, thus, is not only thinking properly but also thinking responsibly, 
as the binding between intellectual and moral virtues highlights. I no-
tice that this ethical outcome of Morton’s argument underlies the 
value of emotions, as useful and beneficial, for the well and right de-
velopment of the epistemic character, and the responsibility towards 
our emotions emerges here as a crucial issue14. 
The meaning of epistemic responsibility emerges clearly in the 
second situation reported by Morton, the one in which the young sci-
entist reveals herself as a chemist dealing with health issues, Morton 
has claimed that “one can exercise the virtue of epistemic responsi-
bility without experiencing any emotion” (Morton 2010: 395). I disa-
gree with this claim, because a notion of either moral or epistemic re-
sponsibility, but which lacks minimal care for the others, signifies ab-
solutely no responsibility. It is true that in deontological ethics, the 
imperative of following the rules does not arise from the recognition 
of the fellows’ sympathy as for moral sentimentalists. However, it 
does not necessarily imply that one of the motivations, unless not the 
major, that lays down responsible actions, is not the care for the oth-
ers. Therefore, if we would accept that care, at work in the practice of 
virtue, has an intrinsic emotional component, and that ethics, as care 
for the others15, is at the ground of responsibility, it follows that, un-
less the performance of responsible acts of care may be motivated by 
reasons other than emotions, responsibility, both moral and epistem-
ic, should not be understood outside the ethical horizon.  
The ethics of knowledge has been studied a lot in the recent 
years, particularly regarding epistemic injustice and epistemic culpa-
bility. Remarkably, Miranda Fricker (2007) has argued for an ethical 
account of epistemic practices, stressing the fundamental role per-
formed by training, for example of testimonial perceptual capacity or 
sensibility. Moreover, she has stressed the responsibility we need to 
endorse in the judgement building (Fricker 2016). Regarding what I’m 
                                                          
14 Regarding this meaning, see Stocker 2004: 136-7. This specific notion of intel-
lectual emotions as something valuable for knowledge seems dependent from 
one of the most established definition of emotions as judgment of value, instan-
tiated, for example, by Nussbaum 2004. 
15 I assume here the meaning of ethics as “care for others” from feminist care 
ethics (see Gilligan 1982, Noddings 1982). 
Laura Candiotto, Epistemic emotions 
 
 17 
arguing here, this is meaningful, because it underlies the importance 
of the training of the epistemic character and, therefore, of the re-
sponsibility towards the components that constitute her intellectual 
virtues. For Stocker (2004: 139), one of the functions of the epistemic 
emotions16 is exactly the one that characterises the sort of person 
who is doing something, and thus, regarding our example, to became 
a responsible epistemic agent. 
 
 
4. Epistemic emotions as one of the building blocks of intellectual virtues 
 
It follows that epistemic emotions build the character of the epistem-
ic agent. This is my main thesis. They are not only the motives that 
lead her to act in certain ways and in certain circumstances17, but 
they are at work within the agent as one of the building blocks of her 
intellectual virtues. Since intellectual virtues are character traits, thus 
epistemic emotions, as component of the virtues, are at the ground 
of the character and helps constitute it – or transform, as I will say 
later – as a proficient knower. 
The notion of affectivity as background is well depicted by psy-
choanalysis (Stocker 2004: 137) and by enactivism (Colombetti 2014), 
for which, for example, affectivity is the primordial way in which an 
organism acts, knows, and decides, in a certain environment. The 
neuroscience of emotions has demonstrated that in any normal situa-
tion emotions are constitutively intertwined with cognitions18 and, 
                                                          
16 For Stoker, the other primary function of epistemic emotions is to help make 
the doing of something good for the person doing it. Stoker called them “intellec-
tual emotions”, stressing the connection between intellectual emotions and 
agency. He has not only underlined the more common functions of these kind of 
emotions as cause, aspiration, evaluation, and value, but also their valence in the 
constitution of the value of the actions performed by an epistemic character. 
Emotions, in fact, “are not just features of everyday, healthy, and good life, but 
also that they help make everyday life – indeed everyday intellectual life – 
healthy and good” (Stocker 2004: 144).  
17 The literature about the notion of “emotions” as “motives” is very wide and 
well-established, and it has to do with the idea that the role of the epistemic 
emotions may be the one to make a topic salient because they disclose its value. 
Regarding the notion of emotions as motives, see de Sousa 1987. 
18 Recently the interactional model has been replaced by the integrational model 
(Gray et al. 2002) for which emotions and cognition are fully integrated within 
certain processes, as learning, perception or memory. This integration for Sten-
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specifically for my aim, it has underlined the primacy of emotions 
(LeDoux 1996) of over reasoning, for which they possess the “capaci-
ty to precede and cause particular lines of thought” (Franks 2006: 
39)19. Nevertheless, I do not want to extend here the discussion to 
covert emotions or the emotional unconscious, because my aim is to 
clarify the conscious process of manipulation of epistemic emotions 
within the training of the epistemic character20. 
In virtue epistemology, intellectual virtues always refer to the ep-
istemic agent, and not only to her cognitive act, or to the excellence 
of her epistemic character. Attaining the knowledge, in fact, depends 
on the epistemic ability of the agent within a specific context. It is ex-
actly within this framework that my thesis acquires meaning. Epis-
temic emotions are one of the building blocks of the intellectual vir-
tues because they are the energetic material starting from which – 
and in the composition with other technical skills, norms, judgements 
of values and aims – the agent builds patterns of action as disposi-
tions and habits for thinking well. Within her processes of thinking as 
embedded and embodied, epistemic emotions are the bodily re-
sources that make her thinking something vital for her agency. There-
fore, as building blocks, they are at work within the same practice of 
the virtue – they are not just the primitive material that, after the re-
finement, is not visible anymore – as its resource. 
As building blocks, epistemic emotions enable the practice of the 
virtue, not only as motives for action but also as steps to the educa-
tion for the embodied character. They psychologically constitute the 
knower within the epistemic agency. In fact, as virtue responsibilism 
                                                                                                                      
ning (2002) is at the base of our process of reasoning and produces the imple-
mentation of cognition within affective structures. 
19 This thesis is not prima facie contradicted by the model of the parallel system 
of control. LeDoux (1996), in fact, has proposed to understand emotion and cog-
nition as separate but interacting mental functions. On the other hand, Ronald de 
Sousa, discussing the model of the parallel system of control, has underlined its 
challenge for the role of emotions in reasoning and has proposed to understand 
emotions as the bridge between the “intuitive” and the “analytic” system. See de 
Sousa 2008: 68-70. 
20 For Sherman and White (2003: 36) including emotions in the constitution of in-
tellectual virtue does not require that emotions can operate consciously only. 
Here I am focusing on conscious emotions because I am depicting the notion of 
affective abilities as results of epistemic training but I agree with the authors that 
we could include the unconscious component of our emotional life within our 
analysis of intellectual virtues. 
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has clearly underlined, the character traits involve “a positive psycho-
logical orientation toward epistemic goods” (Baehr 2011: 102), and 
this orientation, in my account, is made possible by the epistemic 
emotions.  
Claiming that epistemic emotions are the building blocks of intel-
lectual virtues implies that they are not only side-effects within the 
process, but that they play a causal role in it. This means that we 
should not only recognise their presence in the process, but also de-
tect in which way they cause the knowledge. 
Morton (2010), denying the thesis for which epistemic emotions 
are just side-effects, exemplifies it, saying that curiosity “operates 
through a pressure on the person’s patterns of awareness, what she 
notices and ignores, so that it comes with a characteristic feeling” 
(Morton 2010: 394). 
In my account, the causality in play here is not only one of the mo-
tives for action, but the one that leads to the constitution of the epis-
temic character in the agency through training. I propose to call this 
role “transformative” in order to stress the power of epistemic emo-
tions in building a certain type of character, the epistemic one. Oper-
ating on the person’s patterns of awareness, their transformative 
power operates not only in the action, but also in the same structure 
of the character. In fact, epistemic emotions are involved in the trans-
formation of the character’s epistemic side, since they transform the 
agent in a skilful knower, enabling her to develop intellectual virtues 
and, furthermore, perform them responsibly. Therefore, I introduce 
two meanings for understanding epistemic emotions as one of the 
building blocks of intellectual virtues: the first – the one that is more 
recognised by the literature and that I have analysed in the previous 
section – is the one for which epistemic emotions are building blocks 
as motivational component, and the second – the innovative one that 
I have introduced in this section – for which epistemic emotions are 
building blocks as a transformative component. 
 
 
5. From virtues to abilities 
 
Recognising epistemic emotions as the transformative power at the 
ground of intellectual virtues implies that they are a necessary (but 
Laura Candiotto, Epistemic emotions 
 
 20 
non-sufficient21) component for knowledge, and that their beneficial 
role resides exactly in their structural entanglement with intellectual 
virtues in the building of the successful epistemic character. In fact, if 
we can grasp them as facilitating conditions (but not necessary) for 
the practice of the epistemic virtue focusing on the motivation com-
ponent, we can attain their stronger value as a builder of the epis-
temic character, recognising their transformative power.  
Since emotions build the character, it is necessary to nurture and 
train them in order to make them a valuable and stable support for 
virtue. Intellectual virtues stabilise the epistemic emotions in affec-
tive abilities, regulating them within the pattern of decisions. In this 
process, intellectual virtues are intimately connected to the proper 
emotional functioning (Roberts and Jay Wood 2004: 4), that enables 
the construction of the affective abilities. Thus, the dynamic process 
that binds together epistemic emotions and intellectual virtues is not 
only the one that makes epistemic emotions one of the components 
of intellectual virtues, but also the one that moves from intellectual 
virtues to affective abilities. The machinery is, therefore, efficiently 
dynamic and procedural, and permits, thanks to intellectual virtues, 
to transform epistemic emotions in affective abilities ready for the ac-
tion. In fact, thinking virtuously not only discloses epistemic emo-
tions, but builds the affective abilities that will stably belong to the 
epistemic character. 
By “affective abilities”, I mean those emotional capacities that, de-
riving from the refinement of the epistemic emotions, are ready to be 
used in order to enhance cognitive processes. For example, and re-
garding intellectual perseverance, Heather Battaly (forthcoming) has 
depicted the emotional component as a disposition to respond to ob-
stacles with the appropriate degree of confidence and calmness, in 
the given context. I mean for “affective ability” what Battaly has 
called “disposition” since the process I am indicating is the one that 
makes epistemic emotions affective to those abilities ready to be 
used in the right time and place. In fact, affective abilities make epis-
temic emotions appropriate and beneficial for the cognitive task. As a 
side remark, I would mention that this topic is crucial for applied epis-
                                                          
21 Epistemic emotions are not enough by themselves, think for example at curios-
ity as not enough for the truth-seeking (see Brady 2009). I argue that they are 
one of the necessary building blocks of intellectual virtues, cooperating with the 
other components in order to make the knower excellent. 
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temology, especially in education22, since it discloses the horizon of 
the practice of the virtue and the necessity of the training to pass 
from epistemic emotions to acquired affective abilities. 
I argue that the notion of training is crucial for all the processes, 
from epistemic emotions to intellectual virtues, and from them, to af-
fective ability. Affective ability, in fact, leads to the virtue side of af-
fectivity, and thereby, to its excellence. The excellence is not existent 
by nature, but, as in the case of intellectual virtues, should be trained. 
Therefore, epistemic emotions are subject to the refinement of rea-
son, in order to increase their epistemic efficacy, thus becoming af-
fective abilities. Epistemic emotions are natural powers possessed by 
an embedded and embodied epistemic agent that trains them. They 
are not only a natural power that a priori leads to the knowledge 
achievement, but the training, as a social practice within specific cul-
tural environments, makes them abilities that are acquired as intel-
lectual virtues23. Agency, in fact, discloses the social dimension of the 
epistemic emotions and of the intellectual practices performed by so-
cial agents24. 
Although Julia Annas belongs to the group of scholars who em-
brace the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues, for 
which, following Aristotle, emotions are components of moral virtues 
and not of the intellectual ones, she has recognised that emotions are 
involved in the development of an intellectual virtue as perseverance 
or intellectual honesty (Annas 2003: 16). Therefore, regarding her 
specific claim about the development of an intellectual virtue, I would 
argue that not only does epistemic emotion have the power to trans-
form the character (“the transformative component”), but also that 
they should be transformed, through training, into abilities. As under-
                                                          
22 Regarding a view of education, sensitive to connections between cognition and 
emotions, see Scheffler 1991 (chapter 1), and regarding applied virtue episte-
mology in education see Baehr 2016. On the cognitive role of emotions in learn-
ing environments see Candiotto 2016. 
23  See Kvanvig 1992 for the social/genetic epistemology. 
24 Alfano and Skorburg (forthcoming), underlying the social dimension of the 
practice, have stressed on the importance to develop researches on the collec-
tive dimension of the generation and training of intellectual virtues. I think that 
this venue of research is very promising and a combination with the researches 
on we-intentionality wherein group agency and collective emotions may be fruit-
ful. 
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lined by Hookway (2003a), this means to allow epistemic emotions to 
have a role in epistemology, as they have in ethics. 
Another benefit of the approach I am drawing here – i.e., the one 
for which epistemic emotions are the building blocks of intellectual 
virtues – is that it helps to understand them as the character’s re-
sources for inquiry, rather than just static belief. It follows that 
knowledge is the practice of knowing, and it is performed by an em-
bodied knower that, in the action, develops her intellectual virtues. 
In fact, I should be motivated to think well (epistemic emotions as 
motives), and I have the resource for doing this (epistemic emotions 
as building blocks); therefore, and thanks to the training, epistemic 
emotions lead the process that affirms intellectual virtues, making 
the agent intellectually virtuous (epistemic emotions as transforma-
tive component). Finally, they become our affective ability, ready to 
be reiterated in the process. 
The epistemic character has the responsibility towards her epis-
temic emotions and to the process that makes them abilities. In this 
context, the notion of deliberation acquires the meaning of the right 
choice for self-transformation, which is to transform epistemic emo-
tions in those abilities available for the cognitive tasks and for attain-
ing the cognitive success. This notion is strictly connected to one of 
the mastery of epistemic emotions in the realm of the expertise, that 
I cannot develop further here. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
What makes an emotion epistemic? In this paper, I specified some 
crucial elements within the broad definition I provided at the begin-
ning, i.e., the one that says that epistemic emotions are those emo-
tions that have to do with knowledge, claiming that they are epistem-
ic in the meaning of contribution to the knowledge achievement. This 
is made possible for their causal role as building blocks of intellectual 
virtues, that I understood within virtue responsibilism to be character 
traits of the epistemic agent, and, specifically, are motives for the 
thinking (the motivational component) and the transformation of the 
character in a successful knower (the transformative component). In 
fact, this machinery, framed within the horizon of the responsible 
training, leads to the transformative power of the agent in proficient 
knower. Moreover, I understood intellectual virtues as the patterns in 
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which we use our intellectual skills and abilities (Hookway 2003a: 88), 
and, finally, I reached, among these abilities, the notion of affective 
abilities as the refinement of epistemic emotions through training. 
Therefore, affective abilities, as the refined epistemic emotions ready 
to use within the practice of intellectual virtues, are the secure and 
beneficial dispositions that enhance the responsible practice of cogni-
tion. 
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